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ABSTRACT
Turkey’s relationship with the European Union (EU) has a long history 
that reaches back to its application for associate membership in the 
European Economic Community (EEC) in July 1959 and the resulting 
Ankara Agreement in 1963. Turkey made its official membership 
application in 1987 and was granted official candidate status in 1999. 
Throughout this long process, Turkish political elites perceived EU 
membership as an ideal for Turkey and highlighted their commitment 
to their alization of Turkish accession to the EU. However this 
ideal, began to change towards the second half of the 2000s. Many 
commentators take October 2005 the official start of membership 
negotiations between Turkey and the EU, as the beginning of the 
end, the turning point where the ‘golden age’ of the EU membership 
project ended, after which it gradually began to Euroscepticism. There 
are more than enough reasons for the growing Euroscepticism in 
Turkey. In this context, the study aims to analyze the reasons of Euro-
skepticism in Turkey with particular focus on Adalet ve Kalkınma 
Partisi-AKP (Justice and Development Party) and how this suspicion 
would affect the membership course.
Keywords: Euro-Skepticism, Turkey, Justice and Development Party.
1. INTRODUCTION
Formation of the European Union had its objective in 
the beginning to improve the economic development in the 
member states and to promote exchange of goods. At that 
stage, another objective of the formation was to reduce the 
effect of the national factor in the relations between the states. 
European people had learnt,in a tragic way through two world 
wars, which both had strong ethno-nationalist emphasis, that 
a share communal domain was a means for socio-economic 
and national egoism specific to the sovereign states. For 
these reasons architects of the European Union had focused 
on prioritizing the economic issues with the thought that an 
increase in the overall welfare level would enhance the level of 
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tolerance (Condruz-Bacescu, 2014). This argument has been supported 
with a great faith by many countries. Nevertheless, the faith in the 
European Union has turned into a suspicion, initially, due to economic 
concerns, then, due to political reasons following the Maastricht Treaty. 
Thereby, this counter stance referred to as Euro-skepticism has become 
the basic policy of several political parties in member and candidate 
countries over time.
While initially the rhetoric of “becoming part of Europe-the 
civilized world” was passionately embraced by both political elites and 
intellectuals in Turkey and EU membership was evaluated in an idealist 
framework; the developments inthe course of membership have eroded 
the said idealism in Turkish society, and changed the relationships with 
EU into a more pragmatist and skeptical structure. In this context, 
the study aims to analyze the reasons of Euro-skepticism in Turkey 
with particular focus on Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi - AKP (Justice 
and Development Party) and how this suspicion would affect the 
membership course.
2. FROM FAITH TO SUSPICION : ORIGINS AND 
EVOLUTION OF THE EUROSCEPTICISM 
The concept of Euroscepticism is first seen to have been used on 
the newspaper The Times on 11 November 1985 to define the skeptic 
opposition to the European Union and its policies. Nevertheless, the 
concept would gain popularity worldwide with the well-known “Bruges 
Speech” of Margaret Thatcher, the Prime Minister of Britain, on 20 
September 1988. The opposition in the speech of the Prime Minister 
in Brussels that sovereignty of the European Union would supersede 
and annihilate the sovereignty of Great Britain was going to make a 
considerable impression (Apodaka, 2015):
“We have not successfully rolled back the frontiers of the state 
in Britain, only to see them reimposed at a European level, with a 
European super state exercising a new dominance from Brussels”. 
The speech of Thatcher in 1988 made a significant impact on the 
discourse encompassing the EU. This impact indeed resulted from the 
fact that Thatcher was the first European leader to have first directly 
challenged the direction proceeded by the European Union. With this 
speech, an agenda shaped by the politicians, public and media began 
to form around the Treaty on European and the concept began to be 
discussed in media and political spheres (Usherwood & Startin, 2011). 
While historical origins of the concept are in Great Britain, the 
concept started to increasingly take root in other places with signing 
of Maastricht Treaty in the early 1990s. However, in those places, 
the concept of “Euroscepticism” adapted in a different way by being 
articulated to the national political discussions. Thus, the concept 
began to gain meaning with different national political conventions 
and different experiences of different states shaped by the discussions 
2 0 1 6 / 1
27
Euro-Scepticism In Turkey
encompassing the European integration. For example, the concept of 
“souverainist” could be used instead of Eurosceptic. In this example, 
souverainism defines a policy targeting to protect national sovereignty 
of the state in both national and economic issues. This is a strong 
negative position toward the European integration when compared 
to those who defend less integration in certain fields of policy or who 
are against grant of more sovereignty to the political structures and 
institutions of Europe (Harmsen et al. 2004). 
Spread over by being evolved with Maastricht Convention, and 
originated from Britain, the most common definition of Euroscepticism 
known is by Paul Taggart. Having defined the concept in a very inclusive 
manner initially, Taggart defines Euroscepticism as the expression of the 
thought of entire or unconditional opposition to the European Union 
as well as a conditional and qualified one. Later, Taggart was going to 
revise and narrow this broad definition with a specific reference to the 
Central East European countries. In this narrow and specific definition, 
the concept of Euroscepticism now has two different appearances: 
‘soft’ and ‘hard”. Hard Euroscepticism implies rejection of the political 
and economic integration of Europe in its entirety and opposition to 
membership of one’s own country or its staying as a member to the 
European Union, whereas soft Euroscepticism defines conditional or 
qualified opposition to the European Union (Taggart & Szczerbiak, 
2001).
In addition to the discrimination between hard and soft 
Euroscepticism, the two appearances of Euroscepticism may be 
discriminated as ideological and strategic considering the underlying 
driver. Ideologically driven Eurosceptic is under the influence of 
Euroscepticism due to its own ideological stance. His values and 
normative political targets stem from its ideologies in the beginning. 
Hence, a political party chooses and adopts a hard or soft Euroscepticism 
stance against the objectives, policies and targets of European Union. On 
the other hand, the skepticism we encounter in the strategically driven 
Euroscepticism is nothing else than a pragmatic attitude assumed by 
the parties usually to expand its group of voters, attract new voters or 
broaden its political influence zone, although the ideological stance of 
the party is not so different (Ultan & Ornek, 2015).
It is possible to mention about different reasons for the syndrome, 
named as a British syndrome in the beginning, and spread to whole 
continent nowadays. Among all major criticism for EU action is the 
democratic deficit, lack of transparency, lack of flexibility, complicated 
language, the trend of creating a highly centralized super state, fear of 
a symbolic threat to the national communities. The major obstacle in 
relations with the European institutions seems to be the impossibility 
to identify suitable ways of managing the relationship national vs. 
supranational at the level of governmental responsibilities (See Table 1) 
(Condruz-Bacescu, 2014). It should also be noted that aforementioned 
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reasons also vary in historical perspective. Until the 1990s, skepticism 
involved macroeconomic performances of the countries; suspicion 
was rising as inflation and unemployment increased, whereas falling 
as inflation and unemployment decreased. In the subsequent years, 
we confront the individual economic suspicions characterized as a 
reaction to the common market as the reason for suspicion. According 
to this explanation, the increasing job insecurity of individuals brings 
about anger at EU and a suspicion emerging on anger. In the 1990s, 
despite good economic conditions, the increase in suspicion about 
EU brought about shift of the attention in understanding skepticism 
from economic reasons to social and political reasons. This is mainly 
because that, following Maastricht Treaty, as the European integration 
advanced from establishment of a common market to formation of an 
administrative method, skepticism began to combine with the concern 
of erosion of national sovereignty and national identities. Based on 
these explanations, it is possible to suggest that the policies conducted 
by EU are determined within the framework of their relationship with 
national interests. A skepticism emanates from the perception that EU 
poses a “cultural” threat to what is national and the economic interests 
(Koklu, 2013).
Table 1: Types of Euroscepticism
Euroscepticism based 
on economic criteria
Euroscepticism 
based on the crite-
ria of sovereignty
Euroscepticism 
based on demo-
cratic criteria
Euroscepticism 
based on political 
criteria
Quantifies pragmati-
cally the major benefits 
and costs originating 
from EU membership, 
resulted or not from a 
cooperative process.
Considering that, 
at EU level, coop-
eration shall not be 
a challenge to na-
tional sovereignty. 
These eurosceptics 
support suprana-
tional cooperation 
in matters that the 
state cannot manage 
alone (such as en-
vironmental issues 
and the fight against 
organized crime), 
but wish to preserve 
national skills for 
socio -cultural 
policies.
Perceives the cur-
rent institutional 
structure of the 
Union as insuffi-
cient in terms of 
representation and 
democratic partici-
pation of citizens.
Assesses EU action 
based on the doc-
trine of belonging 
to a political family; 
analysts believe that 
the dominant form 
of this disproof is 
social
Source: Condruz-Bacescu, 2014. 
3.EURO-SCEPTICISM IN AKP PERIOD: OUTGROWTH 
DISTANCE AND SELECTIVE ADOPTION 
Turkey’s relationship with the European Union (EU) has a long 
history that reaches back to its application for associate membership 
in the European Economic Community (EEC) in July 1959 and the 
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resulting Ankara Agreement in 1963. EU membership has become a 
reality for the Turkish public and elites, and is seen as a means to further 
national democratisation, modernisation and economic development 
(Buyukbay, 2010). This faith, however, began to change towards the 
second half of the 2000s. Many commentators take October 2005 the 
official start of membership negotiations between Turkey and the EU, 
as the beginning of the end, the turning point where the ‘golden age’ 
of the EU membership project ended, after which it gradually began 
to Euroskepticism (Yaka, 2016). There are more than enough reasons 
for the growing Euroskepticism in Turkey. In this context, the Customs 
Union participated in without becoming member, the Cyprus problem 
hindering opening of the negotiation chapters, Copenhagen political 
criteria as one of the reasons increasing particularly the nationalist 
reactions, Turko-scepticism describing opposition of EU members 
states to EU membership of Turkey, and the partnership relation which 
did not end up with membership, as well as the membership course that 
has been continuing for a long time. In addition, the Sevres Syndrome 
describing the thought that EU demands would abolish the nation-state 
structure of Turkey, EU demands do not solve the terrorism problem, 
but rather they further strengthen it, and the religion difference 
emphasizing that the EU consisting of Christian countries would not 
make Turkey, with a great majority of Muslim citizens, can be stated 
to be as much important reasons at least as those in the first group 
(Tezcan & Aras, 2015).
While this study aims to discuss the Euro-skepticism in Turkey 
with particular focus on AKP, it should be firstly noted that only AKP 
does not hear of a suspicion about Europe, various parties have had 
suspicion about EU due to the reasons listed above. However, what 
makes AKP different from others is the fact that it sees the course of 
membership to EU as a practical instrument for achieving its goal. In 
fact, the origin of this attitude can be found in the National Vision 
Movement, where AK Party has its roots. National Vision Movement is 
known to show an explicit opposition to the West, which constitutes the 
main axis of Turkish foreign policy, thus, to EU. Erbakan, the founding 
leader of National Vision Movement, and his parties criticized EU 
for economic, cultural and political reasons. According to Erbakan, 
EU was a Christian club with imperialist desires on Turkey. As will 
be discussed in the following part,National Vision Movement (Milli 
Gorus Hareketi) under the leadership of Erbakan modified its rigid 
stance towards the EU over time.Despite the Movement’s Eurosceptic 
stance,particularly in late 1990s the party adopted a more positive 
discourse to the EU. In Turkey, political Islamists have been repressed 
for being a threat to secular character of the state and their parties 
have been closed for multiple times. In the 1990s, EU placed much 
more importance to the democratization and human rights, and the 
political Islamists in Turkey perceived EU as a tool to transform Turkey 
Euro-Scepticism In Turkey
2 0 1 6 / 1
30
particularly in the areas of democratization, human rights, religious 
liberties and the influence of military on politics. Verney claims that, 
as of 1990s Islamists left behind their rigid Eurosceptic approach since 
they realized that “Europeanization, as a path to democratization, 
could create a framework that allows the establishment of a stable 
Islamist government”. While the assumption of establishment of an 
“Islamist government” is too assertive, it is a fact that,particularly 
following 28 February period1, political Islamists have, as will be seen 
in the next part, used Europeanization to enhance human rights and 
democratization in Turkey for their own interests (Cicek, 2012). When 
the Islamist-rooted AKP came to power in November 2002, it initiated 
a vigorous campaign to accelerate Turkey’s pace toward Europe. 
Given the then explicit and strong support of the Turkish society to 
EU membership, strengthening of Turkey’s European perspective has 
been quite instrumental for the AKP to consolidate its place within the 
political establishment (Kaliber, 2013). In this context it is possible to 
say that AKP took over as an instrument for its own period the pro-
EUstance of the National Vision that was dominant in their most recent 
period, turned it into a strategy which it put into practice or used in the 
area of domestic-foreign policy (Tezcan & Aras, 2015). As expressed 
by Balci (2013) and Alessandri (2010), complete acceptance of the EU 
objective by AKP, which was in more need for international support 
than other political parties since 2002 to gain political legitimacy, 
has served the process of legitimation of the party in Turkey and 
international areas. In addition to being part of the said legitimization 
process, the encouraging expressions of EU inthe summits 2000, 2001 
and 2002, also, the emphasize on establishment of civil control on the 
military (Yankaya, 2009) have turned harmonization with EU norms as 
the only peaceful means of restricting role of the military in democracy 
of Turkey (Dogan, 2005) into a useful instrument. In short, EU 
norms have been seen as an opportunity for expanding the political, 
economic and cultural space that had contracted for Islamic groups in 
the 28 February period, the democratic terms stipulated by EU prior 
to participation have both strengthened and legitimated the positions 
and demands of Islamic groups (Yankaya, 2009). Additionally to all, in 
early 2000s there was a huge public support for the EU membership in 
Turkey and it was rational for the newly-established AKP to adopt a 
pro-EU stance. In 2002, rate of the supporter of Turkey’s membership 
to EU was around 64%. Taking a pro-EU approach AKP also aimed 
to get support of liberal and central media, business organizations 
1 28 February 1997 is one of the most important dates in Turkish democratic history. At the regu-
lar meeting of National Security Council on 28 February 1997 the government in which Erbakan 
was the Prime Minister was given a list of proposals aiming to “prevent what the Council saw as 
Islamization of the country”. After the National Security Council summit harsh discussions on the 
secularist structure of the state were made in political and public level. For some circles Erbakan 
and his party were accused of being against secularism. As a result of these pressures the Erbakan 
government resigned in June 1997. This period was called 28 February Process and post-modern 
military coup in Turkish democracy literature (Cicek, 2012).
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like TUSIAD and civil society organizations.EU membership was 
so popular among the public that pro-EU approach helped to the 
electability of the AKP. The EU objective was particularly important 
in order to continue the political reforms and to unite different groups 
around the reforms. And the AKP comprehended this atmosphere in 
Turkey and embraced the EU process. As the majority of public was 
enthusiastic about membership, it would have been irrational for the 
AKP to adopt a Eurosceptic approach (Cicek, 2012).
This has lasted until 2005, the AK Party in power has constantly 
expressed its pro-EU views on one hand, and started to quickly realize 
the reforms require for harmonization on the other hand. So, Onis 
(2008) designates the period through 2002 to 2005 as the gold age of 
EU process. In this period AKP combined domestic and foreign policy 
issues in order to use the external factors for the transformation of 
Turkey. In other words domestic politics in Turkey were Europeanized 
in this period (Cicek, 2012). Following commencement of the 
negotiations on 3 October 2005, very interestingly and paradoxically, 
the Euro-enthusiasm of the AKP cadres in the early 2000s was 
replaced by Euro-fatigue and postponement of the implementation 
of EU reform strategy by the incumbent government. The second and 
third terms of the AKP rule (2007 to the present time) are marked by 
Euro-skepticism and a drift from Europeanization (Kaliber, 2013). 
According to Ozcan (2010) and Yaka (2016), what ended the golden 
age is the fact that AK Party, which had shaped its legitimacy and its 
difference from the former line on the basis of establishment of close 
relationships with EU, is not in need of this relationship as much as it 
was before. The rising hegemony and public support of the AKP, which 
secured 47% of the votes in the 2007 elections, enabled the government 
to initiate a social and political transformation without needing the 
instrumentality of the EU membership project. While agreeing with 
this idea, it should also be stated here that there are other reasons 
which increased skepticism in Turkey in that period. For example, in 
December 2006, the EU suspended negotiations on several chapters 
of the accession negotiations, the reason for that is Turkey refused to 
allow (Greek) Cypriot ships and planes into Turkish facilities. Given 
Turkish and Turkish Cypriot support for and Greek Cypriot rejection 
in 2004 of the UN-sponsored Annan Plan to reunify the island, 
many Turks felt that this decision was unwarranted and evidence of 
the EU’s ‘unbalanced’ approach to this problem. Expressions of anti-
Turkish sentiment from European leaders - containing Germany’s 
Angela Merkel and France’s Nicholas Sarkozy- also contributed to the 
problem (Kubicek, 2011). European leaders have declared openly on 
several occasions that Turkey would not become a full EU member 
at the end of the process and Turkey’s accession would “deal a fatal 
blow to the very notion of European identity (Usul, 2014). Beside the 
Cyprus problem, Double Standard Treatments and French-German 
Euro-Scepticism In Turkey
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Attitudes, negative perceptions among the Muslim and Western world 
also played an important role in the rise of Euro-skepticism among 
Turks. Following the September 11 attacks by the Muslim terrorists, 
Islam phobia started to rise and European’s view of Islam changed from 
bad to worse by the influence of the European media. This eventually 
resulted in a decrease of the support of European people for Turkey’s 
membership to EU,which in turn reduced the enthusiasm of Justice 
and Development Party for EU Membership (Guler, 2011). The decree 
of European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) on Leyla Sahin in 2005 
was totally a breaking point. It was a monumental development that the 
Grand Chamber of the ECtHR agreed to hear Sahin’s case at all, since 
two previous applications concerning Turkish headscarf had been 
ruled inadmissible. Nevertheless, Sahin case ended up with temporary 
defeat of the hijab supporters. In the hijab case, the Grand Chamber 
concluded that fundamental rights could be interfered in order to 
protect others’ rights and freedoms and to maintain public order. While 
acknowledging that the prohibition was an interference in Sahin’s right 
to express her religion, the Chamber decided that prohibition could 
be applied in order to protect rights of third parties, maintain public 
order, assure the principles of equality and laicism in Turkey. This 
decision of ECtHr was not welcome at all by the AKP leaders, who saw 
the Europan Union a liberating power in terms of religious freedoms 
as well as release of the prohibition of hijab. The AKP’s disappointment 
immediately turned its elite and clientele Eurosceptic, revealing that 
the AKP had actually perceived the EU as an instrument (Kaya, 2009). 
As a result of all these developments the AKP is reflected in the 
hardening tone of the then Prime Minister, now President, Recep 
Tayyip Erdogan, who frequently invites the EU to ‘play it open’, to be 
‘the man of his word’, etc. Those toughening remarks were not all empty 
gestures. The Turkish government may feel that it has other options 
besides the EU. The AKP has started to pursue a new foreign policy 
strategy, that aims to construct Turkey as an independent and respected 
regional and global player. Several scholars have suggested how ideas 
of ‘neo-Ottomanism’ and the desire for greater engagement with the 
Muslim world have animated Turkish foreign policy under the AKP 
government. Part of the motivation is economic, as Turkish economic 
interaction with its non-EU neighbours grew markedly in the second 
half of the 2000s. With the Turkish economy growing by over 10% 
in 2010 while European economies remained stagnant, some began 
to question how much Turkey really needs Europe. Older strategic 
alliances are also being re-considered (Yaka, 2016; Kubicek, 2011). 
Given also the harsh effects of the Eurozone crisis, the self-confidence 
of Turkey in its relations with EU and its thought of seeking for other 
strategic partners can be understood better. Nevertheless, a cyclical 
change rather than a permanent change in this balance of power may 
be interpreted as a sign of the inferiority and superiority complexes 
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shaping the psyche of the Turks in their relations with Europe. Keyman 
and  Aydın-Duzgit (2013) (cited by: Yaka, 2016) refer to this new 
appearance of Euroscepticism, i.e. underestimating the importance of 
Europe and overestimating the power of Turkys as a global power as 
delusional Euroscepticism.
Despite all these suspicions and thought of the then President 
Erdogan involving participation in the Shanghai Cooperation 
Organization instead of EU so as to expressly show Brussels that it is 
not the only option for Turkey, as also expressed by Tezcan and Aras 
(2015), EU membership desire of AK Party continues in principle. 
This does not mean that Euro-skepticism has come to end in AKP, 
but implies that AKP has realized the perceptual distinction between 
Europeanness and EU membership, and that it has succeeded to 
approach the issue of EU pragmatically.
4. CONCLUSION
In signing convention with EEC, Turkey did had done this due 
the concern of not being excluded from the organizations in Europe, 
which it regarded as the tie to modernization, on one hand, and as a 
result of a pragmatic concern like security. Regarded as a foreign policy 
and security instrument in the beginning, EU could not receive much 
support from publicin this respect, but remained merely the preference 
of economic and political elites. However, several segments become 
passionately desirous about membership to EU for economical motives, 
while some desired for its values inherent in modernity. Besides the 
faith in modernity, it worth to note that Turkish people have always 
had the suspicion about Europe and its integration due to various 
reasons. In this context, it can be suggested that the concerns about 
Europe as reflected in discourses of AK Party cannot be attributed only 
to AKP, but that the public and almost all of the political parties in 
the arena of politics have the same concern. What makes AKP unique 
in this respect lies in that they have turned the course of membership 
to EU into a practical instrument for their own goals by realizing the 
perceptual distinction between Europeanness and EU membership.
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A Look at Modern Social 
Religion as a Regressive 
Concept: Exploring the 
Power of Misinformation
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ABSTRACT
The concept of religion is constantly under the scruples of redefini-
tion. Ranging from arguments regarding the similarity and validity 
of state and theistic religion, to the morality of those who choose to 
reject the latter, religion is by far the most heated topic of discussion 
in any social circle today. Due to this, one would be remiss to pass 
up the opportunity to document the newly sprung notion of social 
religion; in particular, the morphing of social activism into social reli-
gion. The fact that contemporary theistic belief is increasingly held in a 
communal sense reveals that its purpose can be effectively categorised 
as social; hence the marrying of theistic and societal religion in this 
work. Though the distinctions are clear and numerous, the similarities 
cannot be ignored. Rationality needs more practice. 
Keywords: Religion, Misinformation.
1. INTRODUCTION
The concept of religion is constantly under the scruples of 
redefinition. Ranging from arguments regarding the similarity 
and validity of state and theistic religion, to the morality of 
those who choose to reject the latter, religion is by far the 
most heated topic of discussion in any social circle today. 
Due to this, one would be remiss to pass up the opportunity 
to document the newly sprung notion of social religion; in 
particular, the morphing of social activism into social religion. 
Third wave Feminism (not to be confused with the successful 
and absolutely justified first wave) and its adherents (often 
dubbed regressives/Social Justice Warriors or simply ‘SJW’) 
have become fuel for the toxic mindset that is modern social 
religion. It is important to note the true definition of religion. 
Though religion does not mean faith, when one uses the word 
it has historically most likely been used in the theistic sense, 
its true meaning covers all forms of obsessive and zealous 
adherence to a set of established rules. This distinction is the 
root of religion’s inherent negativity. One must place ‘faith’ in 
an ideology in order to become a zealot. This faith is not subject 
to internal rational scrutiny (if it is to be maintained) and thus 
is inherently irrational, regressive, and rather imagined. 
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1.1 Problem Statement
The idea of an imaginary ideology is not difficult to understand, or 
so one would hope. All one has to do is conduct a thought experiment. 
First, take your moral values, if they are religiously driven then you 
already inadvertently understand rationale based on warped reality, 
and then assign them to an arbitrary system of objectively false beliefs. 
It can be anything. It can be a belief in a God, a strict code of law set 
by an illiterate man who lived thousands of years ago, or even a social 
movement based on outdated facts. Now, your belief may only go this 
far, which is not physically dangerous but surely mentally so, but others 
may take your ludicrous notions and carry them into the civilised world 
as their gospel. If the question of danger is taken care of and proven to be 
insignificant, as it always should be, then one must turn to truth. Why 
must a person believe in fiction in order to justify reality? The answer 
is fear. The idea of ignorance through fear is an idea that has most 
recently, in mainstream thought, been championed by neuroscientist 
and moral philosopher Sam Harris (2004). To understand religion, he 
claims, one need only look to the emotions evoked when a vulnerable 
mind contemplates death. That is the key to all religious belief. Harris 
clearly outlines the trickle-down effect of fundamentalist religious 
belief. If religion is wrong about the origins, behaviour, and future of 
the universe, it is then more than reasonable to suggest that its idea of 
life after death is equally false. This is where fundamentalism begins. 
Fear of death. Fear of reality. To counter this fear, one must conjure 
up, or simply adopt, a false ideology in the hopes that it will ease this 
fear. To consolidate this belief, one must then spread this view with 
intense fervour, to neighbours, friends, and even children, so that they 
may feel validated in their ignorance. This is the principal of ‘imaginary 
ideologies.’ It is so rampant, even today, that it has poisoned the minds 
of those who would otherwise behave in a manner appropriate to 21st 
Century rational thinking. The tactic to spread one’s warped logic 
extends beyond traditionally lax familial ties. Unlike contemporary 
theistic religion (which is not to insinuate its innocence, but rather 
its relativity), modern feminism believes in unified, unchallenged 
policing of thoughts. To stray from the established ‘sexist-free’ mindset 
is not to have a lapse in judgement, it is equivalent to true crime. The 
punishment is social and economic exile. 
2. THE REGRESSIVE LEFT
Perhaps the biggest perpetuator of this wilful ignorance is the 
‘regressive left.’ A term popularised by author Maajid Nawaz, it refers 
to the fundamental apologist section of the traditional liberal left-
wing. In the interest of all encompassing, misguided multiculturalism, 
the regressive left have deemed it an act of bigotry to criticise certain 
ideological belief systems; in particular, Islam. Nawaz(2013, p. 210) 
focuses on the word ‘regressive’ as this distortion of liberalism allies 
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itself with the most regressive theocratic regimes of the middle-east. By 
sheltering outdated ideas from criticism, regressive ideals have begun 
to spin a tale that paints other left-wing subscribers as having a narrow 
and exclusive mindset; a most ironic and misinterpreted set of beliefs. 
This sheltering includes more irony than sense. Those who adhere to 
the strict and yet confounding rules of regressivism seek to eradicate 
what they deem as racism. This is done in an attempt to eliminate the 
stigma that certain races might carry, warranted or not. What needs to 
be understood however is that if one chooses to lump people together 
based on the colour of their skin (as regressives are wont to do), then 
one must accept the facts and statistics that arise from such a blanketed 
categorisation. 
2.1 Liberal or Regressive?
The idea behind such a regressive ideology is a misapplication 
of classic liberal principles. By misinterpreting the liberal principle 
of acceptance, the regressive left become beacons for respect without 
criticism (Nawaz, 2013 p. 210). This idea is so ingrained in their 
community that any form of religious criticism, contemporarily this 
is again most common with Islam (as they ignore their own), is seen 
as bigotry or even racism; quite a stretch of the definition considering 
that religion is not a race. The true concept of liberalism subscribes to 
the idea of acknowledgement. It operates on the belief that all ideas 
must be acknowledged if constructive discussions on morality and 
real world application are to occur. This does not however imply that 
any such idea must be respected or become immune to ridicule. All 
ideas must be tested intensely. Without this approach, societies run 
the risk of allowing ignorance and bigotry to run rampant without an 
intelligent challenge to the principles that foster them. This is exactly 
what has occurred in the western world, and through association, the 
middle-east as well, with the rise of this ‘regressive left.’ 
3. THE ‘SOCIAL JUSTICE WARRIOR’
Without a filter on ridiculous beliefs, this idea is most dangerous in 
the realm of politics. Beginning largely as a criticism on the treatment 
of Islam by the west, the regressive left is effectively the result of a 
knee-jerk reaction to neo-conservative foreign policy implementation 
(Nawaz, 2013). This idea is further based on the belief that organised 
military invasions of middle-eastern nations are worse than smaller, 
sporadic acts of Islamist terrorism. While it is obvious that these ideals 
carry the risk of infecting the political sphere, the real danger of this 
ideology lies in its sense of duty. Those that subscribe to it have been 
driven by a misguided sense of social justice to intensely challenge 
what they deem as bigoted criticisms of middle-eastern cultural and 
religious values. The intense fervour with which this distorted world 
view is being pushed is analogous to an attempt at ideological warfare. 
Believing victory to be more important than intellectual conversation, 
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the regressive left have made it their goal to attack those who do not 
share their views. The regressive idea is not to look at the ideas being 
criticised, but merely focus on the fact that they are being criticised. 
To the regressive left, belief systems should be immune to criticism as 
anything else would mean denying multiculturalism (unless it regards 
their own agenda, such as the systematic destruction of cis-gender 
pronouns). In the online world, meaning those in forums and threads 
dealing with social and political expectations, the subscribers have 
been dubbed ‘social justice warriors’ (SJW), rather ironically. 
With Us or Against Us
Ironically, by attempting to put an end to violent clashes of 
ideologies, that is, the mentality of ‘us against them,’ the regressive left 
have only served to strengthen that very ideal. Due to their vicious 
and defensive nature, the regressive left have created a barrier between 
dialogue and change. The only change they profess is the end to a specific 
intolerance which they neither genuinely interpret, nor understand. To 
understand the idea of criticism against Islamist ideology, one need only 
have the capacity to evaluate ideas for what they are truly worth. Does 
this ideology spread hate, distrust, or bigotry? If so, it must be open 
to scrutiny. It is rather interesting and bewildering to note that these 
regressive principles never apply to ideologies which do not hold at 
their core the belief in a religious truth. Following this regressive mode 
of thinking, an ideology must be allowed to flourish if it is held by a vast 
number of people. This perpetuates the idea of quantity over quality. 
No other argument needs to be made to reveal the ridiculousness of 
this ideological double standard. A rejection of this idea then leaves 
several topics unanswered. 
4. MORALITY
When one rejects religion, they are left with the question of 
morality. The highest form of morality then becomes altruism. But 
why then must altruism be followed? This brings to the fore ideas of 
what can be called micro and macro morality. Macro morality refers 
to topics that deal in progress and prosperity; such as murder, rape, 
torture etc. Micro morality refers to manners, respect, minor human 
interaction etc. While all sane individuals agree on the principles of 
macro morality, there is a big divide in the conduct of micro morality. 
Since religion preys on the idea that one cannot possess macro morality 
without a belief in God, and for all intents and purposes this idea is 
a scientific fallacy, it becomes the burden of the atheist to provide 
themselves with specific micro moral guidelines. This is usually taken 
on by communities within different nations, and these ideas differ, with 
just cause (Hitchens, 2007). 
4.1 First Step
Once morality is established as the greatest divide in human history, 
one must then develop a system of dialogue that can take place without 
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violence. Though this is difficult to do, and some rightly argue that it 
is impossible in an absolute manner, it must be undertaken. In order 
to pose the question of macro and micro morality to different nations, 
one must understand that vast numbers of people within those nations 
will refuse to question their beliefs. It is then reasonable to discard 
those individuals. It is of no use to any form of critical discussion to 
have unwilling radical deniers. It cannot be argued that morality does 
not stem from human understanding, specifically through the passage 
of time (Dawkins, 2006). Context is the defining measure of morality. 
If one presents the idea that morality has supernatural origins, as all 
theistic religions claim, then that discussion is no longer useful. When 
one believes in an absolute power, they believe in it absolutely (this 
holds true for social religion too). And it is known in human nature 
that absolute power corrupts absolutely. Only by taking that out of the 
question can dialogue begin. So when one begins to talk about global 
morality, one must discard religious intrusion. That is the first step. 
4.2 Uphill Struggle: Reformation
In order for effective change to take place, in the form of religious 
reformation, one must be prepared for a struggling ‘bottom up’ approach. 
This refers to action through dialogue and suggests its starting point as 
questioning the religion, not the religious; one will inevitably expose 
the other. This of course has many obstacles, the strongest of which 
is irrationality, not to mention a requirement of abnormal amounts 
of patience. Can this be achieved? While that remains in doubt, one 
must try. The most difficult aspect of the ‘bottom up’ approach to this 
suggested reformation is dialogue. Most often debaters, on both sides, 
are subject to intense monologues; unhelpful displays of ignorance or 
intelligence. To be clear, this is unhelpful in creating significant political 
change as those who are indoctrinated do not take kindly to intellectual 
criticism, regardless of its legitimacy. 
4.3 Moderate Responsibility
The tough question remains; who is responsible for bringing about 
change? The answer is simple in theory: everyone. In practice however, 
things are quite complicated. Indoctrination, fear, and irrationality all 
stand in the way of reason. Religion has through history caused a mass 
suppression of educated rationality. This can only be remedied through 
grueling, relentless dialogue (Nawaz, 2013). This burden should mostly 
fall on religious moderates, not unbelievers. By this it is meant that 
because those in a position of religious influence have a certain power 
over other theists, it is their responsibility to make sure that their 
respective religion is reformed to fit the modern times that they live in. 
It is obvious that those who do not listen to reason, cannot be reasoned 
with. That is why imaginary beliefs must be tweaked to fit into modern 
society. It is literally a matter of trickery, not reason, when attempting 
to reform the ancient self-proclaimed and utterly misguided religious 
ideologies of both past and present. While written reform would 
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be most helpful, it is impossible as that in itself would cause violent 
reactions. As such, the only remaining option is interpretation. That is 
what is meant by trickery. Together, moderates and unbelievers may in 
fact have a chance at global religious reformation. The question is how 
long will it take? No one can possibly know the answer. 
4.4 Effective Criticism
Though without the possibility of a working time frame, one can 
still seek to engage in religious reformative dialogue with patience and 
the ability to look through a contextual lens. To do this, it is paramount 
to a clear understanding of religious dogma that one comprehend 
the complexities of free will. Riding on the coat tails of Sam Harris’ 
work on ‘Free Will,’ (2012) it can be understood that the views that 
one possesses, and the actions that these ideologies create, cannot be 
used to paint religious people in a black and white morality brush. 
While accountability is still a concept that needs refining, it is clear 
that indoctrination is a clear problem in realising the realities of the 
universe. The most difficult aspect of this case is the knowledge it brings 
to those who suffer from a lack of ‘free will.’ It has to be understood that 
it is not favourable to admit to such a reality. The pressure and ridicule 
that one may encounter when revealed to be a religious believer is often 
times a deterrent to enlightenment. Nobody wants to believe that they 
were tricked, or that they were wilfully dismissive of the truth. This 
is not to say that one should be wary not to offend the minds of the 
religious, it simply implies that one must take care to exclude them from 
enlightenment through shame (Dawkins, 2006). Those who have been 
fooled into believing a certain dangerous fairy tale should be given the 
chance to change their minds without feeling shunned by a community 
that had support doing the same. To be clear, dangerous religious ideals 
should be ridiculed and destroyed, but once those ideas are shattered, 
there should be no shame in admitting previous wrong doing through 
dogmatic influence. Though this seems to be a very shaky premise for 
acceptance, it is one that must work in order to completely integrate 
indoctrinated persons into modern scientific thinking. 
5. ISLAMOPHOBIA
Without succumbing to criticisms of utilising the ‘straw man’ 
approach, it is quite easy to point out the hypocrisy of regressive 
propaganda regarding false Islamophobia. The most popular 
approach in the contemporary social media sphere is anti-white/west 
arguments. Those in the regressive camp claim that because the West 
was responsible for the Crusades, and Christian violence in general 
(a rather large generalisation that people fail to realise stemmed from 
Europe and not the United States), they are somehow now unable to 
criticise modern religious extremism (Nawaz, 2013). To point out the 
ridiculousness of this claim, one need only look to a possible future; it 
would mean that the Muslim population, or Middle East in general, 
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would have no right to criticise any acts of fanatic violence because the 
culture they are a part of had at one point committed atrocities in the 
name of religion. Another example would be if the black population of 
the US began to capture and hold white slaves. Under the logic of the 
regressives, the white population would have no right to criticise these 
acts. Now, some would claim that this example is different because it is 
not religiously motivated, but that rebuttal in itself would suggest that 
religion be allowed special consideration. No organised community 
has the right to undermine another for no valid reason. There is no 
exception. 
5.1 Religion ≠Science
While it remains a heavy topic for debate, it should be quite clear 
that science and religion are incompatible. One at its very essence must 
rebuke the other to be true. Historically, the former has consistently and 
successfully done so to the latter. Most controversially, in recent times, 
the area in which religion has failed is evolution. Charles Darwin’s 
theory of evolution is undoubtedly the most important biological 
scientific discovery in the history of science (Dawkins, 2006). Though 
unimaginable to some during his time, his hypothesis has since been 
proven. While the scientific community is delighted to have such a 
great understanding of the history of life, many religious institutions 
do not share this enthusiasm. To them, if evolution is true, major parts 
of all holy books must be false; specifically, the story of Adam and Eve. 
This would mean that these ancient texts have a fundamental lack 
of understanding when it comes to the history of humanity and the 
animal kingdom in general. Admitting that a holy book is false in any 
aspect is not something that religious people take lightly. This explains 
the warped logic behind the extreme backlash to the proven theory of 
evolution. 
5.2 Reason Over Faith
All the attempts in this paper to advocate reason and evidence as 
the main proponents of human progression are not for the purpose 
of offense or any political agenda. While it is obvious that it is riddled 
with loaded statements, the hope is that this work will convince fence 
sitters to simply question their ideological background. It is a deluded 
thought to hope for religious destruction, that much is clear. It will 
not happen. Rather, it is important to realise that nothing should be 
free from question. Hopefully it will become clearer to some through 
a reading of this text that there is absolutely no logical reason why 
religion, any religion, should be subject to special treatment and able 
to police the thoughts of their followers. That is all that you may be. If 
you are religious, you are a follower. Your faith is nothing but blind. In 
literal terms, there is no evidence to suggest that something which has 
no basis in reality, exists. Sure, it can be true that specifically for theistic 
religions a God might exist, but is important to note the difference 
between maybe and definitely. There is one thing any rational mind 
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must accept; one cannot possibly know if there is a God or not, but one 
thing that is definitely clear is that there has been no event or shred of 
evidence in history to suggest that believing in one is rational, logical, or 
factual. This same wilful irrationality is prevalent in the predominating 
false idea of a first world western gender pay gap. To claim that one 
exists is to wilfully mislead the public through a misinterpretation of 
the given statistics (Farrell, 2005). A belief in something that cannot be 
proven is lunacy. It is the wilful rejection of reason. As Lee Harris states, 
it is the “suicide of reason.” 
6. PECKING ORDER
Not only is religion the ‘suicide of reason,’ it is the birth of 
unreason. Allowing one’s life to be completely dictated by millennia old 
unimaginative and immoral fantasies is tantamount to mental illness. 
That is not said out of spite, but out of precedent. How many people 
have you known of (or had the displeasure of knowing) that claimed 
to be some form of deity reincarnate? How many of these people have 
you taken seriously? Your answer should be the same for any form of 
indoctrinating dogma as it is for the aforementioned situations. If not, 
you live in a mental reality perpetuated by fantastical bias. And not just 
any bias. Bias that is divisive, racist, sexist, and overall dictatorial. Each 
religion operates on a hierarchy of moral hubris (though the social kind 
stops at ‘True Believer’);
Apostate <Unbeliever < Uninformed < Believer < True Believer < 
Priest (or equivalent) < Religious Leader < Prophet < God  
This is the hypocritical, ludicrous, and absolute judgemental 
system of importance in every mainstream monotheistic religion. 
Though each category is simply <another, they are by no means 
indicators of how far apart they truly are. All levels below ‘True Believer’ 
are negligible (and often times sentenced to death) in different belief 
systems. Mathematically, they cannot all be right. This means that if, for 
arguments sake (and only for arguments sake), one of the mainstream 
religions is true, a vast majority of the population are immediately 
sentenced to hell for the simple act of being born in the wrong place 
and wrong time, with no evidence given to persuade them to convert to 
the ‘right’ religion. Now take this information and apply the truth: none 
are correct. That still leaves all religions the freedom to actually believe 
that every opposing and equally abhorrent faith system has doomed its 
followers to hell through blasphemy. What rational being would believe 
this? There is no rationality here. 
Rational Approach
What is rationality? In layman’s terms it refers to something that 
is logical or in accordance with reason. Religion in reality is none of 
these things. There is nothing rational about religious dogma. An 
explanation full of examples need not to be given in this paragraph to 
reveal the irrationality behind religion. A study of any history of any 
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time of any peoples will do that adequately. It is clearly a system created 
by humans in order to control other less educated humans. It is a top 
down system that can only be solved through a bottom up approach. 
And it is interesting to note that the term ‘solved’ here is not used to 
describe a world without religion, but rather a world rife with reason 
(a world without religion would be a world without the susceptibility 
to faith based lunacy) as no other state of being is practical or possible.
7. REFORM
An area that is quite contested even amongst the most ardent 
atheists is reformism. This is due to the fact that it largely deals with 
cultural identification and morality, not strictly religion. The drift is 
created when one side (for arguments sake we shall assume there are 
two strictly opposing sides) claims that reformist religions should be 
given the spotlight over traditional religions. That is to say, a ‘secular 
liberal Muslim’ should be given just as much, if not more, media 
coverage over a traditional Muslim. This is where a problem can arise. 
It is misrepresentation of the faith, regardless of its intention. To claim 
that a ‘secular liberal Muslim’ falls under the category of Muslim dilutes 
the intellectual debate of both morality and literal truth (Ali, 2015). 
Under this theory, if one (rightly) claims that every Muslim believes the 
Quran to be the true word of God through his last prophet, some (being 
the reformists) would claim that this is stereotyping. These statements 
come from an analysis of traditional Islam, not a dilution of its morally 
corrupt teachings. It is a mistake that is very often wrongly criticised as 
being bigoted and racist; the latter being semantically untrue as religion 
is not a race (Ali, 2015). 
God’s Will
Criticisms of religion can be tied to two main threads; action 
(physical) and truth (mental). To firmly place yourself within these 
parameters of critique your belief must first have a negative effect on 
another human being. While it is argued that even a non-believer 
may do this, it is certainly not by God’s will that they do so. Secondly, 
and most importantly, your belief must be false. It is already obvious 
that all religious doctrines carry false ideas in both the philosophical 
and scientific sense. It is simple to have an unbiased view on religious 
teachings, regardless of belief. Simply remove ‘God’s will’ from any 
action or thought that you might have (it is not hard to imagine) and 
then analyse your actions accordingly. You would be mortified in even 
your simplest religiously supernatural belief or claim. If you cannot 
do that, then you are indoctrinated (Hitchens & Wilson, 2008). It is 
that simple. If this task is too offensive, you can do one of two things; 
grow up, or attempt to prove God’s theistic existence. That is to say 
that he exists in an influential sense, guiding you and everyone (or at 
least attempts to do so with his supposed omnipotence) to either bliss 
or misery. You will not find such evidence. Then ask yourself, are you 
willing to believe anything if it suits your desires?  
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8. QUESTION OF FAITH
For those who belong to a certain religious group, how is it that 
you choose your beliefs? Do you believe in your holy book in its 
entirety? If you do, you are a literal member of that sect and any other 
interpretation is a diluted form of worship. This is not an opinion, it 
is a literal fact. If you are a diluted believer, what prompts your moral 
decisions? How is it that you may, with a clear conscience, analyse the 
validity of God’s will in a holy book that proclaims to be so without 
inconsistency? Perhaps a new perspective will help. A rather vehement 
religious zealot, being a true believer in the respective holy text, is 
entirely driven by what they perceive as the word of God. Every waking 
moment is thus controlled and accounted for by their theistic deity. 
There is no room for doubt. There is no room for rationality. This is the 
highest form of indoctrination and brings one to feelings of sympathy. A 
moderate however, is an interesting case. One who possesses the ability 
to filter out certain passages in a holy text but submit to others is not 
in a position to lecture on morality. This is where problems arise with 
religious acceptance in contemporary society. The regressive left wing is 
increasingly accepting and enabling religious moderates as though they 
were the pinnacle of moral affection (Harris & Nawaz, 2015). It cannot 
be reasonable to suppose that one who, with the ability to rationalise 
decisions individually, chooses to remain either racist, homophobic, or 
sexist. This ‘ability’ often leads to a superiority complex. What these 
moderates see as a reformed religion is in fact a clearly conscious form 
of immorality. An indoctrinated religious zealot is amoral in the sense 
that it inhibits free will. A moderate is thus immoral with an application 
of this same logic.
8.1 A Different Perspective
Ardent religious defenders are quite akin to contemporary 
caricatures of ‘fandom.’ Their relentless and often overzealous defence 
of the observable plot holes in their beloved source material blinds 
them from the obvious truth; they aggressively follow and obsess over 
a work of fiction. How is this moral in any sense? It actually draws 
sympathy. Unlike the aforementioned ‘fandom,’ religious adherents 
carry the burden (which they enthusiastically dismiss) of proving their 
work of fiction to be anything but. Since the documented manmade 
creation of religion thousands of years ago, this has never occurred. 
One must then ask why? The answer is quite evident. Extraordinary 
claims require extraordinary evidence. In the minds of the religious 
however, this logic is warped; supernatural claims require supernatural 
evidence. Thus, their ideas cannot be falsified. While immoral, it is not 
unbelievable that one would attempt to keep increasingly false claims 
unfalsifiable when that claim is in the business of controlling all who 
have religious faith. Religious authority has proven to be absolute over 
those who are unwilling or incapable of refusing it. As is constantly 
proven throughout history, absolute power corrupts absolutely. 
Religion is embarrassingly corrupt (Hitchens, 2007). 
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8.2 Insult to Intelligence
While it is well known that the religious are adamant about 
keeping their holy figures free from criticism (or even humour), it is the 
hypocritical nature of this that is most interesting. Attempting to filter 
‘offensive’ critique, religion has served as a shielded weapon against 
reason. Planting themselves firmly in every government the world has 
known (Hamburger, 2002), it has become immune to constructive 
criticism in that it claims harassment, racism, or bigotry if this occurs. 
One would not be remiss in realising the glaring irony in this. While 
claiming to be the children of God (or champions of social justice), 
being the chosen few who are shown the truth, they simultaneously 
dismiss the validity of any opposing form of moral teaching. This is 
perhaps the highest form of offence to reason. Claiming exclusive divine 
mental intervention, all theistic religious advocates incessantly claim 
that God invented morality, whether one chooses to believe so (without 
proof) or not. What could be more offensive to one’s intelligence? It 
is literally saying that no person that has ever lived, or ever will live, 
can possibly contain the mental fortitude to make their own decisions 
based on internal interpretations of communal morality.
9. DIFFERENT YET SIMILAR: CONCLUSION
The major difference between theistic and social religion is its 
use of manipulation. The former confuses fact into myth while the 
latter warps myth into fact; to accurately label them, one is deluded 
while the other is regressive. In both cases, it is a wilful suspension 
of reality. Not only do both examples constitute an obsession with 
the disproven, but also a complete lack of contextual comprehension. 
Religion is incessantly a product of its time. Taken out of that time, it 
has proven throughout history that it cannot survive the rationale of 
basic intellectual scrutiny. The modus operandi is the same; the ends 
justify the means. 
The delusion is not simply a matter of individual consequence.
One who believes in the biologically inconsistent idea that physical 
gender (or sex) is a social construct operates under the misguided 
thought that self-identification is enough to constitute reality. These 
matters not only affect the mentality of others who might be susceptible 
to such an idea, it exposes them to potential physical repercussions. 
Not only has it become a social vendetta to target anyone who might 
criticise such a drastic notion, it has warped into a politically charged 
subject in its own right. One who supports this case is undoubtedly in a 
more desirable position than one who does not. This is common to all 
religious adherents. To be clear, the contextual concerning factor here 
is potentially unwarranted prejudice. The power of misinformation 
needs only minute study to be revealed. The fact that contemporary 
theistic belief is increasingly held in a communal sense reveals that its 
purpose can be effectively categorised as social; hence the marrying 
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of theistic and societal religion in this work. Though the distinctions 
are clear and numerous, the similarities cannot be ignored. Rationality 
needs more practice. 
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